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Abstract 
People often exhibit confirmation bias: they process information bearing on the truth of their 
theories in a way that facilitates their continuing to regard those theories as true. Here, we 
tested whether confirmation bias would emerge even under the most minimal of conditions. 
Specifically, we tested whether drawing a nominal link between the self and a theory would 
suffice to bias people towards regarding that theory as true. If, all else equal, people regard 
the self as good (i.e., engage in self-enhancement), and good theories are true (in accord with 
their intended function), then people should regard their own theories as true; otherwise put, 
they should manifest a Spontaneous Preference for their Own Theories (i.e., a SPOT effect). 
In three experiments, participants were introduced to a theory about which of two imaginary 
alien species preyed upon the other. Participants then considered in turn several items of 
evidence bearing on the theory, and each time evaluated the likelihood that the theory was 
true versus false. As hypothesized, participants regarded the theory as more likely to be true 
when it was arbitrarily ascribed to them as opposed to an “Alex” (Experiment 1) or to no one 
(Experiment 2). We also found that the SPOT effect failed to converge with four different 
indices of self-enhancement (Experiment 3), suggesting it may be distinctive in character. 
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In general, people see themselves favorably. This phenomenon, called self-
enhancement, takes many forms (for reviews, see: Gregg & Sedikides, 2014; Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008). Amongst other things, people exhibit a “self-enhancing triad” (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988): more than strict rationality would warrant, they entertain favorable self-views 
(Schmitt & Allik, 2005), consider themselves to be in control (Presson & Benassi, 1996), and 
regard their future prospects as bright (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001). But perhaps the 
most blatant sign of self-enhancement is social comparative in nature: the better-than-
average effect (BTAE; Alicke & Govorun, 2005).  
Self > Others I: The Better-Than-Average Effect 
People generally judge themselves to stand better than their peers across a variety of 
everyday desirable dimensions. For example, 90% of US road users put themselves in the top 
50% in terms of their driving ability (Svenson, 1981); 50% of US academics put themselves 
in the top 10% as regards their teaching ability (Cross, 1977); and 25% of US high-school 
students put themselves in the top 1% as regards their social ability  (College Board, 1976–
1977). Even incarcerated criminals consider themselves nicer than the “average community 
member” and no less law-abiding (Sedikides, Meek, Alicke, & Taylor, 2014). Such strikingly 
self-serving judgments suggest that they are shaped by a potent motive to self-enhance 
(Alicke & Sedikides, 2009, 2011).  
 Admittedly, the BTAE is not entirely motivationally based. As critics have contended 
(Hamamura, Heine, & Takemoto, 2007; Moore, 2007), several cognitive factors also underlie 
it. These include a general preference for individuals over collectives (Klar & Giladi, 1997), 
an overweighting of information about the self relative to others (Pahl & Eiser, 2005), and the 
fact that the dimensions judged are often commonplace and controllable (Kruger, 1999). 
Nonetheless, the BTAE effect persists even when controlling for key confounds (Alicke, 
Vredenburg, Hiatt, & Govorun, 2001) and is moderated in ways that are difficult to explain 
only cognitively (Guenther & Alicke, 2010; for a review, see Sedikides & Alicke, 2012). For 
example, above-average effects covary with the personal importance of the dimension 
judged, whether it is measured or manipulated (Brown, 2010), and across both Western and 
Eastern cultures (Sedikides, Gaertner, & Cai, 2015; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). 
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In sum, the balance of evidence implies that people see themselves as better than average at 
least partly because they want to. 
Importantly, the BTAE is also contagious: not only are self-evaluations susceptible to 
comparative inflation, but so too are evaluations of entities connected to the self. For 
example, reflecting the fact that people identify with significant others (Aron et al., 2005), 
parents regard their own children as possessing more positive and fewer negative attributes 
than children in general, and they do so in proportion to how favorably they regard 
themselves (Wenger & Fowers, 2008; see also Buunk, 2001). Similarly, reflecting the fact 
that people identify with larger collectives (Searle, 1995), people show evaluative and 
behavioral preferences for everyday groups to which they belong over groups to which they 
do not (Hewstone, Rubin & Willis, 2002), and again in proportion to how favorably they 
regard themselves (Otten, 2004). 
Self > Others II: Ingroups, Names, Birthdates, & Possessions 
Even though people are often unaware of the fact that they exhibit a BTAE (Pronin & 
Kugler, 2007), it nonetheless requires an explicit comparison of self with others, or 
alternatively, separate explicit evaluations of self and others, which the researcher then 
compares. Yet the relative inflation of entities connected to the self also emerges in more 
subtle ways (Greenwald & Banaji, 2005). 
For example, arbitrarily assigning people to different groups is sufficient to make 
them discriminate positively in favor of fellow group members when distributing rewards 
(Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). This minimal group discrimination effect is 
consistent, amongst other things, with the self acting as an evaluative base, from which 
greater positivity is assigned to an ingroup (Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Otten, 2005). 
Recent evidence suggests, moreover, that a preference for the ingroup emerges, among those 
who identify with it, even when the ingroup and outgroup differ in name only, and even when 
those preferences are indirectly assessed (Roth & Steffens, 2014). 
Inanimate entities also succumb to such comparative inflation. For example, people 
manifest a spontaneous preference for letters in their own name over letters in other people’s 
names, even controlling for valence-relevant confounds such as letter frequency (Koole & 
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Pelham, 2003; Nuttin, 1987). This name letter effect emerges for the digits that enumerate 
one’s birthday (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). Moreover, such lexical and numerical egoism 
has consequences. Participants told that a disreputable historical character (Rasputin) shared 
the same birthday as they did subsequently denigrated him less (Finch & Cialdini, 1989); and 
participants expecting to interact with someone assigned a code featuring their own birthday 
digits anticipated a better interaction (Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & Mirenberg, 2004). Even 
pairing one’s own (as opposed to another person’s) name with some arbitrary symbol is 
sufficient to make people like that symbol more (Feys, 1991). 
A further sign of such transferred egoism is the endowment effect: people demand 
substantially more money to relinquish an existing possession than they offer to acquire that 
same possession in the first place (Carmon, & Ariely, 2000; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1990). Although loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) or transaction costs (Mandel, 
2002) may partly explain the effect, recent research implicates personal ownership as critical. 
In particular, the effect disappears if buyers own duplicate possessions or if proxy sellers do 
not own any (Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009), making the endowment effect a 
type of mere ownership effect (Beggan, 1992). Indeed, people generally describe their own 
possessions as having more positive, and fewer negative, attributes than other people’s 
possessions, including when they, or another people, come to own a possession by random 
assignment (Nesselroade, Beggan, & Allison, 1999). Moreover, bolstering or threatening 
self-regard, thereby setting in motion self-enhancement dynamics, respectively weakens or 
reinforces the endowment effect (Chatterjee, Irmak, & Rose, 2013), and narcissists believe 
that their own prized possessions are more positively distinctive than independent raters do 
(Lee, Gregg, & Park, 2013). Taken together, these findings suggest that the self imparts a 
motivationally-rooted Midas-like touch to personal possessions that increases their subjective 
value. Yet even the bare act of choosing one object over another—thereby establishing a 
differential link to self—is sufficient to induce a preference for that object at a basic 
associative level (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007).  
In sum, several lines of research converge on the following conclusion: people are 
prone to regard themselves and what they own as superior to others and what they own. 
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Self > Others III: Theories? 
Given that comparative self-inflation occurs across several domains, one might also 
expect it to apply to theories that people hold. How precisely? Whatever other merits a theory 
may have—such as intellectual ingenuity or aesthetic appeal—it will be of greater value if it 
is correct rather than incorrect, given that the primary function of any theory, as opposed to 
fictional tale, is to represent faithfully some aspect of the world. All else equal, then, a good 
theory will be true, and a bad theory false. If so, it further follows that, to the extent that one 
evaluates the self and entities connected to it positively, and to the extent that a theory 
qualifies as an entity connected to the self because one has originated or endorsed it, one 
should be inclined to regard that theory as more likely to be true than false. That is, people’s 
reasoning processes should be biased by the following heuristic, expressible in the form of a 
syllogism: If what I am and what is mine is good, and if good theories are true theories, then 
my theories should be true too. 
The operation of such a heuristic is consistent with the existence of the well-
established phenomenon of confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), whereby people process 
information bearing on the truth of their theories in a way that facilitates their continuing to 
regard those theories as true. As with the BTAE, there is little doubt that many of the 
antecedents of confirmation bias are cognitive in character (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Wason, 
1968); but, once again, substantial evidence exists for a motivational underpinning (Dunning, 
2014; Kunda, 1990). For example, prior ideological commitments, such as political 
prejudices, bias the reception of arguments (Taber & Lodge, 2006); so too do serious 
personal consequences, such as the results of medical tests convey (Ditto, Munro, Apanovich, 
Scepansky, & Lockhart, 2003). Moreover, the degree of biased processing in favor of one’s 
own theories is also surprisingly independent of a key cognitive factor: IQ (Stanovich, West, 
& Toplak, 2013). 
However, as the subtle forms of self-inflation reviewed above indicate, even nominal 
links between the self with various entities—groups, names, numbers, and goods—suffice to 
enhance the evaluation of those entities. Might it also be the case, therefore, that even a 
nominal link between the self and some theory would suffice to enhance evaluations of that 
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theory, such that it would be judged more likely to be true? In particular—in the absence of 
any ideological commitments or personal consequences—could drawing an arbitrary 
connection between self and some theory produce a confirmation bias, as evidence for or 
against that theory accumulated? Otherwise put, would people show a spontaneous 
preference for their own theories—a SPOT effect—under the most minimal of conditions? If 
so, then mere ownership of a theory, of the most superficial and nominal sort, would be 
shown to be enough to occasion a type of confirmation bias. 
A thematic precedent is worth remarking upon here. Mnemic neglect is a processing 
bias in spontaneous recall whose operation implicates a motive to self-enhance. Specifically, 
people are inclined, as a form of strategic self-defence, to forget negative feedback 
selectively —but only when it pertains to traits they consider important an opposed to trivial, 
and only when those traits are ascribed to oneself as opposed to someone else (Sedikides & 
Green, 2009). In the standard case, participants are led to believe that they are receiving real 
feedback, based on responses to a questionnaire (their own or another person’s). However, 
mnemic neglect emerges even when participants receive purely hypothetical feedback 
(Green, Sedikides, & Gregg, 2008; Sedikides & Green, 2000)—that is, even when they are 
asked to imagine that they are receiving negative feedback about important (vs. unimportant) 
traits directed towards them (vs. another person). Thus, even the slightest supposition of self-
involvement suffices to induce motivated forgetting. We wondered whether a similarly subtle 
effect obtained when it came to spontaneous preferences for endorsing theories.   
Overview 
 To test for the SPOT effect, we described a fantasy scenario in which, on a faraway 
planet, two species of alien existed. The theory at issue was that one of the species was a 
predator, whereas the other one was its prey. The theory was initially stated, accompanied by 
a piece of evidence bearing on it. Participants were then asked to rate the likelihood of the 
theory being true or false. Thereafter, additional pieces of evidence were each presented in 
turn, and, after each one, participants completed the same rating task. An arbitrary link to self 
was (or was not) created by altering the wording of the theory’s presentation, such that it was 
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introduced and then repeatedly described as being (or as not being) the participant’s own 
theory.  
 In Experiment 1, we tested whether the theory was regarded as more likely to be true 
when arbitrarily ascribed to oneself than to another concrete person. In Experiment 2, we 
tested whether the theory was regarded as more likely to be true when arbitrarily ascribed to 
oneself than when either arbitrarily ascribed to another concrete person or to no one at all. In 
Experiment 3, we explored whether the magnitude of the SPOT effect was related to various 
other prima facie indices of self-enhancement. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Platform and procedure. The experiment, neutrally entitled “Theory and Evidence,” 
was created using the online software iSurveyTM (University of Southampton, 2015), and 
distributed online via the crowdsourcing service CrowdFlowerTM to adult residents of 
English-speaking countries. Participants indicated their consent, completed the experiment, 
read a debriefing statement, and entered a voucher number to obtain a pre-arranged nominal 
payment ($0.10), given the brevity of their participation. 
Participants and screening. We initially included a total of 406 cases, identified by 
iSurvey as survey completions. Of these, we conservatively excluded 18.5% on one or more 
of the following grounds: (a) having duplicate IP addresses (3.4%); (b) completing the 
experiment too quickly (3.7%), defined as less than half the median completion time; and (c) 
failing to complete all the truth likelihood estimates (12.6%). All reported at least good 
English, so none were excluded on that ground. 
The final screened sample comprised 331 participants, of whom 38.7% were male. Its 
members varied in age (MAGE = 34.4; SDAGE = 12.3) and education (56.5% with at least a 
university degree, the remainder with at least a high school or equivalent diploma), and came 
largely from North America (USA: 86.6%; Canada: 6.1%; UK: 3.3%; all others: 4.0%). 
Screened and unscreened samples yielded equivalent results, so we report only the former. 
Measures and manipulation. 
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Demographics. Prior to completing the experiment, participants reported their gender 
(male, female), age (in years), the country where they currently lived (from a list of 196), 
their fluency in English (perfect, very good, okay, bad, very bad), and their level of education 
(higher degree, college degree, intermediate degree, secondary level, primary level). 
The Wugworld scenario. Following standard admonitions to answer honestly, 
participate seriously, and read questions carefully—combined with assurances that there were 
no right or wrong answers, and that anonymity would be preserved—participants were 
introduced to the experimental task. Up front, they were instructed that their primary goal 
was to “estimate how likely it is that a particular theory [was] either true or false.” They were 
then asked to imagine that some party—let us symbolize them as “P”—was “researching life 
on a planet in a distant solar system” called “Wugworld.” This planet was described as 
inhabited by many alien creatures, some of which were predators, and others prey. The terms 
“predators” and “prey” were, moreover, mutually defined to ensure comprehension. 
Specifically, participants were told that “predators […] hunt, kill, and eat prey” whereas 
“prey […] are hunted, killed, and eaten by predators.” Participants were further told that two 
of the creatures on Wugworld were called “Niffites” and “Luupites,” and that P was 
“interested in researching them.” 
P, it transpired, had already discovered a fact about Niffites and Luupites. Labelled 
“1,” and offset in bold and italics for emphasis, it read that “Niffites are at least twice as large 
as Luppites.” Participants were then asked to“[s]uppose [P has] a theory, based on the fact 
above.” Also offset in bold below, the theory read as follows: “Niffites hunt, kill, and eat 
Luupites.” Next, participants were asked to “[…] indicate, on the basis of the fact provided, 
how likely it is that [P’s] theory is either true or false, using the scale below.” The scale 
consisted of a moveable slider, where participants could, by clicking and dragging with their 
computer mouse, shift a bar horizontally towards either end of a bipolar scale, marked only 
by the contrasting endpoints “Certain to be FALSE” and “Certain to be TRUE.” Specifically, 
participants were told “Move the slider towards the right if you think your theory is more 
likely to be TRUE;”  “Move the slider towards the left if you think your theory is more likely 
to be FALSE;” and “Place the slider near the middle if you think your theory is about equally 
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likely to be TRUE or FALSE.” The slider initially appeared in the middle of scale. Moving 
the slider returned a position-sensitive value ranging between 0 (Certain to be FALSE) and 
100 (Certain to be TRUE). 
Once participants had provided their truth likelihood estimate, they advanced to the 
subsequent screen. Thereafter, six additional screens, identical in format and featuring the 
same slider, appeared. Each screen had P discovering “a new fact” about the alien creatures. 
The subsequent three facts, labelled “2,” “3,” and “4,” were designed to provide somewhat 
circumstantial support for the theory. They read as follows: “Niffites have powerful teeth and 
dangerous spikes on their heads;” “The number of Niffites in a region rises and falls with the 
number of Luupites in a region;” and “Niffites and Luupites often have aggressive 
interactions.” The final three facts, labelled “5,” “6,” and “7,” were designed to cast more 
definitive doubt on the theory. They read as follows: “Luupites have sharper teeth than 
Niffites do;” “Luupites have been observed eating the dead bodies of Niffites;” and Luupites 
have been observed attacking Niffites.” On each of the six screens, participants were 
instructed to provide each new likelihood estimate “on the basis of the facts provided so far.”  
The experimental manipulation was straightforward: P was either the participant 
themselves or another person. When P was the participant, the word “you”—addressing them 
directly—appeared in the Wugworld text; when P was the other person, the word “Alex” 
appeared instead. Accompanying verbs and possessive forms were also modified. In addition, 
to rule out a methodological confound, we experimentally counterbalanced which set of alien 
creatures, Niffites or Luupites, was said by the theory to be the putative predator or its prey, 
by switching around the names. These were the only differences between the experimental 
and control condition. 
Note that several features of the Wugworld scenario were engineered to help test our 
experimental hypothesis. First, the theory that participants considered—which pertained to 
life on an imaginary planet far away, and posited a relation between two previously unknown 
aliens—could hardly be one towards which they would have any pre-existing partisan bias. 
This permitted us to test cleanly for the comparative inflation of theories connected to the 
self, in the absence of any complications such as prior ideological commitment. Second, the 
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names for the aliens, Niffites and Luupites, were carefully pretested in other research to 
ensure their semantic nullity and evaluative neutrality (Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). This 
served to discourage the formation of connotations suggestive of predators or prey. Finally, 
the theory was ascribed in a control condition to a concrete person, going by the popular and 
androgynous name of “Alex” (cf. Sedikides & Green, 2009). This had two benefits: (a) it 
arguably served to provide a more stringent test of our hypothesis, given that self-
enhancement effects are typically smaller when contrasted against a concrete other (Alicke, 
Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995); and (b) it ruled out the possibility that 
ascription per se, rather than ascription to the self, was the key factor, compared to a control 
condition where a theory was left unascribed. 
Results and Discussion 
 The estimated likelihood that the theory was true served as the dependent variable in a 
2 ×2 ×7 mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) design, which featured Ascription Target 
(self vs. other) and Alien Name (Niffites = predators vs. Luupites = predators) as the two 
between-group factors, and Fact Number (facts 1 through 7) as the single within-group factor. 
As anticipated, a significant and substantial main effect of Fact Number emerged, 
F(6, 1962) = 386.49, p < .0001, η2 = .74. Inspection of the pattern of means suggests that 
estimated truth likelihood initially rose, then plateaued, next declined sharply, and finally 
slightly levelled off. Consistent with this observation, a significant linear trend emerged, F(1, 
327) = 752.45, p < .0001, η2 = .70, alongside both a quadratic trend, F(1, 327) = 278.87, p < 
.0001, η2 = .46, and a cubic trend, F(1, 327) = 70.54, p < .0001, η2 = .18. Accordingly, 
participants were generally responsive to the earlier facts tending to confirm, or at least 
maintain, the target theory, and the later facts tending to refute it. 
 Did the ascription of the theory to the participant or to Alex influence estimates of the 
theory’s likely truth in the predicted direction? It did (Figure 1). A significant main effect, 
averaging across all within-subject levels, emerged, F(1, 327) = 8.33, p < .005, η2 = .03, d = 
.32. In addition, a significant interaction emerged between Ascription Target and Fact 
Number, F(6, 1962) = 2.25, p = .04, η2 = .01, implying that not all facts reflected the impact 
of the manipulation equivalently. In particular, estimates did not significantly differ for facts 
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1 and 2 individually, but did for all subsequent facts, suggesting that impact of the Theory 
Ascription registered only as evidence accumulated. However, Alien Name neither exerted a 
main effect, F(1, 327) = .52, p = .47, nor interacted with Ascription Target, F(1, 327) = 0.01, 
p = .93. Moreover, no other interactive effects emerged. 
 Although we lacked any theoretical grounds for suspecting that age or gender would 
moderate the SPOT effect, we nonetheless undertook relevant analyses to ensure generality. 
For convenience, we dichotomized participants into young and old based on a median split 
(excluding two participants not declaring their age; Mdn = 31). We then conducted a 2 x 2 
ANOVA, which featured Ascription Target (self vs. other) and Age Group (young vs. old) as 
between-subjects factors. As expected, an effect for Ascription Target emerged, F(1, 325) = 
8.13, p < .005, η2 = .02,  but it did not interact with Age Group, F(1, 325) = .002, p =.96. In a 
parallel analysis, gender (excluding one participant who did not declare it) also did not 
moderate the SPOT effect, F(1, 326) = 1.48, p = .22. 
 Thus, the results of Experiment 1 supported our hypothesis. Participants regarded the 
theory as more likely to be true when it was arbitrarily ascribed to them as opposed to 
someone else, regardless of their age or gender. That is, they exhibited a SPOT effect, 
spontaneously preferring their own theories. This can be understood as a confirmation bias 
driven by a mere ownership effect, in which the positive valence of the self is imparted to a 
theory by sheer association. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 elaborated upon Experiment 1 in three key ways. First, it sought to 
replicate the SPOT effect under somewhat varied conditions. In particular, three features of 
the experiment changed. First, alternative names for the alien creatures were adopted in order 
to ensure that the originals were not necessary to the effect. Second, the participants, instead 
of completing an online survey in private as individuals, now filled out survey booklets in 
public as members of a group (though still anonymously). These varied conditions provided a 
modest test of the methodological generalizability of the effect. Third, and most important, 
Experiment 2 added a condition in which the theory was ascribed to no one. This enabled us 
to test whether ascribing a theory to the self was the crucial factor inclining people to regard 
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that theory as more likely to be true. The results of Experiment 1, for example, could have 
been due either to a spontaneous preference for one’s own theories, or to a spontaneous 
prejudice against another person’s theories. Experiment 2 permitted these possibilities to be 
disambiguated. Specifically, we predicted that the self-ascription condition would differ from 
both the other-ascription and no-ascription conditions, but that these conditions would not 
differ from one another, thereby showing that the SPOT effect was specific to the self. 
Method 
Platform and procedure. Participants took part as members of audiences whom the 
experimenter addressed. Each audience consisted of between 30 and 60 members. Members 
were, in different groups, either undergraduate students currently enrolled at the University of 
Southampton or prospective undergraduate students on visit days accompanied by their 
parents. In both cases, running the experiment served a joint pedagogical and data-collection 
purpose, acting as a springboard to further instruction and discussion, revolving around the 
debriefing. Participation was voluntary and unpaid. Consent was negotiated verbally, with 
audience members being assured that, if they preferred, they could simply observe 
proceedings. The experiment was essentially run by having participants fill out, with the 
experimenter’s verbal guidance, 8-page booklets that reflected the various experimental 
conditions. Prior to administration, these booklets had been arranged into random piles in 
order to ensure non-systematic distribution to audience members. 
Participants and screening. A total of 400 individuals participated. Of these, we 
conservatively excluded 5.5% on one of two grounds: (a) failing to complete all responses 
constituting the dependent variable (0.8%) or (b) showing zero variance on the dependent 
variable (5.0%). (All were native speakers of English.) The screened sample of 378 
participants consisted of two subsamples: 121 current undergraduates and 275 prospective 
undergraduates and their parents. Both were predominantly female—87.6% and 77.3% 
respectively—but the latter was a decade older on average (MAGE = 20.7 versus MAGE = 29.9), 
as well as more chronologically diverse (SDAGE = 3.9 versus SDAGE = 15.7) owing to its 
bimodal distribution, with unsurprising peaks around the ages of both 18 and 50. Screened 
and unscreened samples yielded equivalent results, so we report only the former. 
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Measures and manipulation. 
Demographics. Prior to completing the experiment, participants reported their gender 
(female, male) and age (in years). 
Modifications to the scenario. Given that the experiment was administered by 
booklet, additional admonitions were provided: to read each page in strict sequence and not 
to confer with neighbours. The content of the Wugworld scenario was, however, almost 
identical to that in Experiment 1, apart from a few minor textual alterations. Individual facts 
were presented, and individual likelihood estimates recorded, no longer on successive 
screens, but on successive pages of the booklet. The form taken by the dependent measure, 
however, was non-trivially adjusted, to assist both participants making estimates and coder 
recording their responses. In particular, the slider that participants dragged left or right in 
Experiment 1 was replaced by a horizontal line that they instead marked with their pens. This 
line was subdivided into segments defined by tick marks. Half the tick marks denoted 
percentages ranging from 0% to 100% in increments of 10%; the other half denoted 
unlabelled percentages lying halfway in between. As before, the leftward and rightward 
endpoints were labeled “Certain to be false” (0%) and “Certain to be true” (100%) 
respectively; but additionally the midpoint (50%) was labelled “equally likely to be true or 
false”, and was flanked by intermediate labels “More likely to be false” (25%) and “More 
likely to be true” (75%). Instructions were adapted accordingly. Coders, with the aid of 
rulers, later attempted to derive a number from 0 to 100 from where participants placed their 
marks; however, most respondents put marks at, rather than between, ticks, so most 
likelihood estimates recorded were divisible by either 5 or 10. 
In terms of experimentally intended changes, the two alien creatures were blandly 
renamed “Dassites” and “Fommites,” again with the intention of ridding them of semantic 
content. Counterbalancing proceeded as before. The ascription of the theory to self or other 
also proceeded as before via the insertion of either “you have/your” or “Alex has/Alex’s” into 
the text. However, in the condition where no theory was ascribed to no one, a slightly 
rephrasing was necessary. We substituted “Suppose there is a theory…” and “…that the 
theory is true or false…” for the nominative and possessive respectively. 
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Results and Discussion 
 The estimated likelihood that the theory was true again served as the dependent 
variable, this time in a 3 ×2 ×2 ×7 mixed ANOVA design, which featured Ascription Target 
(self vs. other vs. no-one), Alien Name (Dassites = predators vs. Fommites = predators), and 
Audience Type (enrolled vs. visiting) as the three between-subjects factors, and Fact Number 
(facts 1 through 7) as the single within-subjects factor. 
As before, a significant and substantial main effect of Fact Number emerged, F(6, 
2196) = 276.94, p < .0001, η2 = .43. Estimates of the theory’s likelihood of being true 
followed a similar but not identical trajectory as before: it initially rose, then seesawed up and 
down, declined sharply, and finally slightly levelled off. As before, a significant linear trend 
emerged, F(1, 366) = 502.45, p < .0001, η2 = .58, alongside a quadratic trend, F(1, 366) = 
166.11, p < .0001, η2 = .31, and a cubic trend, F(1, 366) = 32.36, p < .0001, η2 = .08. Once 
again, the facts presented tended to initially confirm, then subsequently refute, the theory in 
the minds of participants, more or less as intended. In addition, Fact Number unexpectedly 
interacted with Audience Type, F(6, 2196) = 4.40, p < .0001, η2 = .01, such that enrolled 
audiences gave higher truth likelihood estimates initially, but lower ones subsequently, than 
visiting audiences—probably a spurious result. 
 Did the ascription of the theory to the participant, to Alex, or to no one, influence 
estimates of the theory’s likely truth? It did (Figure 2). A significant main effect, averaging 
across all within-subjects levels, emerged, F(1, 366) = 3.59, p = .03, η2 = .02. Unlike in 
Experiment 1, no significant interaction emerged between Ascription Target and Fact 
Number, F(6, 2196) = 1.20,  p = .28. But as before, Alien Name neither exerted a main effect, 
F(1, 366) = 0.93, p = .76, nor interacted with Ascription Target, F(1, 366) = 0.93, p = .40. In 
addition, no other main or interactive effect reached significance, except for a barely 
interpretable four-way interaction, F(12, 2196) = 2.28, p < .01.  
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 Collapsing across all other factors, we proceeded to test more specifically, using 
between-subjects planned contrasts, whether the manipulation of theory ascription exerted its 
effects. Averaging across all within-subjects levels, we first contrasted the self condition 
against the other and no-one conditions jointly. As predicted, estimates of the likely truth of 
the theory were significantly greater in the self condition, t(375) = 2.85, p < .0005, d = .34. 
Also as predicted, the other and no-one conditions did not differ significantly from one 
another, t(375) = 0.16, p = .88. Moreover, estimates in the self condition individually 
exceeded those in the other condition, t(375) = 2.37, p < .02, d = .29, and in the no-one 
condition, t(375) = 2.57, p < .02, d = .31.   
 As a supplementary analysis, we again tested the generality of the SPOT effect across 
different ages and gender. Inspection of the age distribution revealed a marked bimodality, 
with one range spanning 15 to 28 years (n = 270) and another 39 to 65 years (n = 100). 
Accordingly, we dichotomized participants into young and old based on either range 
membership, excluding age-undeclared participants (n = 8). In addition, for the sake of 
simplicity and statistical power, we collapsed the other and no-one conditions into a single 
condition, to create a dichotomy between non-self and self. We then conducted a 2 x 2 
ANOVA, which featured Ascription Target (self vs. non-self) and Age Group (young vs. old) 
as between-subject factors. As expected, an effect for Ascription Target emerged, F(1, 366) = 
10.19, p < .005, η2 = .03. However, it did not interact with Age Group, F(1, 366) = 1.52, p = 
.22. In a parallel analysis, gender (excluding six participants who did not declare it) also did 
not moderate the SPOT effect, F(1, 368) = 2.38, p = .12.  
 Thus, the results of Experiment 2 again supported our hypothesis. Participants 
regarded the theory as more likely to be true when it was arbitrarily ascribed to them as 
opposed to either someone else or to no one at all, regardless of age or gender.  
Experiment 3 
 Experiment 3 attempted to replicate the SPOT effect for a third time, but had two 
additional goals.  
The first goal was to check whether being called Alex oneself, or having a friend 
called Alex, might have significantly weakened the results, given that either possibility could 
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have in principle disposed participants to evaluate an Alex-ascribed theory more favorably. 
Nonetheless, we considered this unlikely, because: (a) although Alex is a relatively popular 
name (making the top 100 names circa 2015: http://www.babycenter.com/baby-names-alex-
462505.htm), the proportion of participants in the control condition named Alex was still 
likely to be very small; and (b) the impact of a theory ascribed to a friend is liable to be less 
than the impact of a theory ascribed to oneself, given the converging evidence for the relative 
primacy of the individual self (Sedikides, Gaertner, Luke, O'Mara, & Gebauer, 2013) and for 
people having more positive associations towards themselves than towards even close others 
(Gebauer, Göritz, Hofmann, & Sedikides, 2012).  
The second goal was to test whether and to what extent the SPOT effect varied as a 
function of four prima facie indices of self-enhancement. Two took the form of traits: (i) 
narcissism, a grandiose form of self-regard, and (ii) deceptive self-enhancement (with respect 
to being right), a tendency to overestimate one’s abilities. Two more took the form of 
manifest biases: (i) overclaiming (i.e., claiming to recognize bogus words, as opposed to real 
ones) and (ii) biased argument evaluation (i.e., judgments of argument quality that are 
idiosyncratic as opposed to consensual). By using standard measures of well-established traits 
commonly deemed indicative of excessive self-enhancement, as well as more direct measures 
of self-enhancement in operation, we hoped to cover all our bases, so to speak. On the one 
hand, a priori reasoning, and empirical evidence, suggest that egoistic evaluations of self-
relevant entities should be related to other indices of self-evaluation (Gramzow & Gaertner, 
2005; Wenger & Fowers, 2008). On the other hand, observed correlations are sometimes 
unexpectedly small. For example, various studies have found that the correlation between 
name letter preferences and narcissism ranges from r = -.08 to r = 0.17 (Bosson et al., 2008), 
possibly due to psychometric or other defects in the measurement of the former (Hoorens, 
2014). Consequently, our expectations here were tentative. 
Method 
Platform and procedure. In Experiment 3, the Wugworld scenario and additional 
indices of self-enhancement were administered as part of a larger online study lasting for 
approximately an hour. The Wugworld scenario appeared at the beginning of this study to 
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avoid possible priming effects. The larger study was created, presented, and distributed in the 
same way as Experiment 1, although for appropriately higher pay ($3.00). 
Participants and screening. We screened Experiment 3 participants as part of the 
larger online study rather than as participants in Experiment 3 alone. We recorded a total of 
1918 survey attempts by iSurvey. Of these, we classified1575 (82.1%) as genuine (more than 
half the survey complete). From this subset, we conservatively excluded another 54.2% on 
one or more of the following possible or actual grounds: (a) reporting poor or very poor 
English (0.0%); (b) having duplicate IP addresses (35.7%); completing the experiment too 
quickly (3.7%), defined as less than half the median completion time; (c) failing to complete 
at least 95% of the survey (4.2%); (d) showing zero variance on any survey measure where 
some variance was expected (26.4%). The high rate of IP duplication was due to unexpected 
smallness of the crowdsourced population combined with having been obliged to run the 
survey in several independent stages, thereby permitting repeated participation that we 
discovered belatedly. The high zero variance policy, though it probably excluded many good 
participants, also maximized data quality. 
The final screened sample consisted of 722 participants, of whom 38.9% were male. 
Its members varied reasonably in age (MAGE = 36.0; SDAGE = 11.7) and education (53.8% 
with at least a college degree, and all but two of remainder with at least a high school or 
equivalent diploma), and came largely from North America (USA: 47.5%; Canada: 18.4%) 
and other English-speaking countries (UK: 26.6%; Ireland: 1.8%; Australia, 1.8%; New 
Zealand, 0.8%; all others: 3.1%). Screened and unscreened samples yielded equivalent 
results, so we report only the former. 
Measures and manipulation. 
Demographics. Participants reported the same demographics as in Experiment 1. 
The Wugworld scenario. The presentation and content were identical to Experiment 1 
except that group names were not counterbalanced across predators and prey. This was a 
simplification justified by the absence of any prior effects and the desirability of single 
version of the SPOT for correlational investigations. In addition, following presentation of 
the scenario, participants were asked two questions, to which they answered “yes” or “no” by 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 So
uth
am
pto
n]
 at
 06
:35
 08
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
16
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
19 
 
selecting the appropriate response from a drop down menu: “Is your own name Alex?” and 
“Do you have a friend called Alex?” 
Narcissism. We assessed narcissism using the 16-item abbreviation of the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006), whose psychometric properties 
approximate the original scale. Our version (α = .80), like other recent precedents (cf. Lee et 
al., 2013), featured bipolar items that were not dichotomous, but continuous along seven-
point scales, for greater reliability. Participants responded by shifting a moveable slider, 
originally at the midpoint, left or right. Sample item: “When people compliment me, I get 
embarrassed (R) [vs.] Everybody keeps telling me how good I am.” 
Self-deceptive enhancement (judgment). We took seven items from the self-
deceptive enhancement subscale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding, Version 
7 (Paulhus, 1998) which specifically assessed egoistical overestimations of the accuracy of 
one’s judgment. Participants responded by clicking on radio buttons that defined 7-point 
scales, ranging from “completely false” to “completely true.” Sample items: “My first 
impressions of people usually turn out to be right,” “I am a completely rational person.” To 
maximize internal consistency, we excluded two items with low item-total correlations before 
computing the total (α = .62)  
Overclaiming. We pioneered a version of the overclaiming technique (Paulhus & 
Harms, 2004) suited for internet administration, given that online participants can easily 
“Google” the veracity of alleged claims. Following practice trials, participants were shown 50 
words for three seconds each. Of these, one set of 25 were real but relatively obscure (e.g., 
borborymous, wimple), whereas the other set of 25 were bogus but comparably real-looking 
(e.g., challometry, hylocenium). Participants were instructed to click a button only if they 
recognized a word as real, and otherwise to permit the survey to advance to the next screen 
automatically. Overclaiming was operationalized as the number of fake words participants 
claimed to recognize divided by the number real words they claimed to recognize.  
Biased Argument Evaluation. We administered an updated version of the Argument 
Evaluation Test (Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2015; Stanovich & West, 1997), designed 
to be briefer, more standardized, and less US-centric version of the original, featuring entirely 
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new content. It also incorporated a different criterion of normative rationality, relying on 
consensus rather than expertise. Participants began by indicating, on 7-point scales whose 
options were represented by radio buttons, their level of agreement or disagreement with 24 
assertions about a variety of contentious political issues (e.g., “The institution of marriage is 
meant for one man and one woman,” “The government should ban the selling of high-calorie 
drinks in large containers”). Having provided their own opinions, they then read, for each 
assertion, a set of three additional statements: an argument for it, a counterargument against 
that argument, and a rebuttal to that counterargument. In each case, participants were then 
instructed to judge, again on 7-point scales, “how weak or strong […] the rebuttal […] is, 
while ignoring your own opinion.” On completion of the data collection, and after screening 
the data, mean ratings of the quality of the 24 rebuttals were computed. These consensual 
judgments operationalized the objective quality of those rebuttals. 
Thereafter, an idiosyncratic simultaneous regression was computed for each 
participant. In it, participants’ own opinion about each of the 24 assertions served as one 
independent variable; consensual judgments of quality of each of the 24 rebuttals served as 
the other independent variable; and the participants’ judgments of the quality of each of the 
24 rebuttals served as the dependent variable. In line with Stanovich and West (1997), the 
beta weight expressing the independent prediction of each participant’s judgment by the 
consensual judgment was taken as the primary index of the ability to evaluate arguments 
independently of prior beliefs. We inverted this index to capture biased argument evaluation. 
Results and Discussion 
The estimated likelihood that the theory was true served as the dependent variable in a 
2 ×7 mixed ANOVA design, which featured Ascription Target (self vs. other) as the between-
subjects factors, and Fact Number (facts 1 through 7) as the within-subjects factor. 
Once again, a significant and substantial main effect of Fact Number emerged, F(6, 
4296) = 612.98, p < .0001, η2 = .64. Truth likelihood estimates followed the same pattern as 
in Experiment 1, exhibiting significant trends that were linear, F(1, 716) = 1067.22, p < 
.0001, η2 = .60, quadratic, F(1, 716) = 636.72, p < .0001, η2 = .47, and cubic, F(1, 716) = 
134.99, p < .0001, η2 = .16. As in Experiment 1, a significant main effect of Ascription 
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Target emerged (Figure 3) in the predicted direction, F(1, 716) = 9.37, p < .005, η2 = .01, d = 
.23, once again confirming our experimental hypothesis. Furthermore, as in Experiment 2, 
Fact Number and Ascription Target did not interact, F(6, 4296) = 1.16, p = .327. Finally, in 
analyses collapsing across Fact Number, Ascription Target did not interact with either age, 
F(1, 716) = 2.26, p = .13, or gender, F(1, 716) = 0.01, p = .91. 
 Did being called Alex, or having a friend named Alex, moderate truth likelihood 
estimates? Any conclusions regarding the former are moot, given that only 1.3% of the 
sample (six in the control condition) reported having that name. In contrast, a substantial 
minority 17.5% (66 in the control condition) reported being friends with an Alex. Planned 
contrasts within the control group, however, found no sign of a difference between this 
minority and the majority, t(90.19) = .03, p = .97 (respective Ms = 57.21 vs. 57.27), 
suggesting that the SPOT effect is indeed confined to one’s “own” theories. The handful of 
control participants named Alex did give numerical higher estimates (Ms = 62.07), perhaps 
justifying future investigation. At all events, being or knowing an Alex did not significantly 
affect the results of Experiment 3, and, by extension, they were unlikely to have affected the 
results of previous experiments. 
 Finally, did any of the four indices of self-enhancement—two traits, and two manifest 
biases—significantly moderate the SPOT effect? Before addressing the question, we first 
explored the links among these four indices (Table 1). They formed a coherent positive 
manifold of small but highly significant correlations. One can infer, for example, that the 
more narcissistic participants were, and the more unimpeachable they regarded their 
judgment as being, the more they claimed to recognize fake relative to real words, and the 
less their evaluations of argument quality accorded with more objective consensus estimates. 
A plausible interpretation of the positive manifold is that the four indices converge in 
assessing self-enhancing tendencies. 
 To determine whether any of the self-enhancement indices significantly moderated 
the SPOT effect, we conducted separate analyses for each index in which we regressed truth 
likelihood estimates on (a) a z-score version of that index, (b) a z-score version of the 
experimental manipulation, its conditions coded as +1 and -1; and (c) the multiplicative 
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product of both these z-scores. Both (a) and (b) were entered into the model first, so that the 
residual independent impact of (c)—the interaction terms representing the moderation of the 
SPOT effect—could be tested. This method maximizes statistical power and controls for 
inessential collinearity among the predictors (Aiken & West, 1991). However, in no case did 
the relevant interaction term reach significance (-.05 < β < .002; -1.31 < t[718] < .94; all ps > 
.19). Thus, the SPOT effect, although once again replicated, was not predicted by four other 
indices of self-enhancement, which nonetheless correlated with one another. One explanation 
is simply that the SPOT effect is small, thereby curtailing the magnitude of correlations it 
displays. The effect size in this study was lower than previous studies, and the larger sample 
size may not have been sufficient to offset it. Alternatively, the SPOT effect may be a form of 
self-enhancement that is different in character to others, perhaps being more basic or 
associative in nature (Gawronski et al., 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011). Our null 
effect here is in keeping with research that has also failed to find expected correlations 
between different indices of cognitive bias (Oyer, Gillespie, Issah, & Fasko, 2012). 
General Discussion 
In this article, we demonstrated the existence of a new bias: the SPOT effect. We 
showed experimentally that, even where theory ownership is established in the most minimal 
of ways— simply by asking participants to imagine that a theory is theirs rather than 
someone else’s or nobody’s in particular—participants are inclined to increase their estimates 
of the likelihood that that theory is true, as they consider successive items of evidence bearing 
on the truth of that theory. As such, the SPOT effect is simultaneously a type of confirmation 
bias (Nickerson, 1998), a mere ownership effect (Beggan, 1992), and an instance of self-
enhancement (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008).  
We also demonstrated that the SPOT effect occurs regardless of gender and age 
(Experiments 1, 2, and 3), and that it reflects a pro-self as opposed to anti-other bias 
(Experiment 2). However, we did not establish the precise mechanism underlying it. 
Nevertheless, that the SPOT effect did not correlate with several indices of self-enhancement, 
which are intercorrelated (Experiment 3) suggests it may be distinctively associative in 
character (Gawronski et al., 2007). Future research could profitably explore whether the 
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SPOT effect correlates with susceptibility to self-enhancement effects of a more associative 
sort, such as the name letter task (Hoorens, 2014) and whether it sensibly waxes and wanes in 
response to self-enhancement manipulations that are indicative of motivational underpinnings 
(cf. Jones, Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002). 
How significant is the SPOT effect? The effect sizes we obtained across three 
experiments ranged from d = .23 to d = .34, which places them, by convention, into the 
“small” category (Cohen, 1988). This suggests that, in terms of practical potency, the SPOT 
effect may be modest: compared to other antecedents, it may not augment greatly people’s 
propensity to be partisan in evaluating the truth of their theories. Indeed, we engineered the 
conditions that would maximize the likelihood of obtaining the SPOT rather than faithfully 
mimicking naturalistic settings. For example, we used a theory that was hypothetical and 
otherworldly, rather than real and relevant, to minimize the possibility that any prior opinions 
held by participants would constrain their estimates of the likelihood that that theory was 
true. Furthermore, the manner in which people come to hold theories in everyday life is 
unlikely to be, as in our manipulation, by arbitrary ascription; rather, it is usually by more or 
less elaborate forms of ratiocination (Wegener & Carlston, 2005) or as a result of everyday 
argumentation (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). 
However, we would argue that the significance of the SPOT effect does not reside in 
its practical potency, nor even in its ultimate generality, but rather in its theoretical 
implications (Mook, 1983). The goal of the current research was to test for the existence of a 
psychological effect which might, on some initially reasonable assumptions, be deemed 
unlikely a priori, such that its reliable demonstration would then imply something surprising 
about how the mind works. In particular, one might plausibly argue that so trivial a 
manipulation as drawing a nominal link between the self and a theory should not make 
people inclined to regard that theory as true on the initially reasonable assumption that their 
rationality was even moderately robust to self-enhancing biases. However, that drawing such 
a nominal link does indeed have this effect only underlines how exquisitely sensitive to self-
enhancing biases the human mind actually is (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; Sedikides & Strube, 
1997). Consider: it might well have been the that no self-enhancing partisanship could 
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emerge unless people had first become personally committed to their theory—for example, 
by publicly declaring their support for it (cf. Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991)—such that a 
modicum cognitive dissonance would  be required to engender partisan bias. Our findings, 
however, suggest that no such prior commitment (or any other factor) is necessary: even 
minimally connecting the self to a theory suffices to induce a spontaneous partisanship 
towards it (cf. Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002). 
The same point applies to many cognate effects we reviewed in the introduction. 
Consider, for instance, the minimal group discrimination effect, and its associated paradigm 
(Tajfel et al., 1971). Tajfel and colleagues originally devised that paradigm as a baseline to 
which they expected to have to add further nuances before any group-based discrimination 
would be observed. They discovered, however, that mere categorization into separate groups 
was sufficient to make people differentially allocate rewards to fellow group members. This 
accidental finding underlined the relevance of identity-related categorizations, and spawned 
decades of research clarifying the precise mechanism underlying the effect as well as two 
major theories of social identity (Hewstone et al., 2002). That group categorizations are rarely 
arbitrarily assigned in everyday life, or that the discrimination observed in the paradigm is 
limited in severity (e.g., does not characterize the allocation of penalties: Mummendey et al., 
1992), is secondary: the theoretical significance of the minimal group discrimination effect 
holds above and beyond its practical potency or ultimate generality. 
In closing, the significance of minimal effects, such as the SPOT effect, is that they 
are phenomena which require surprising little to bring about (e.g., mere ascription of 
ownership). Also, that they are brought about at all suggests the presence of profound 
determinants (e.g., self-enhancement motivation) that have considerable theoretical 
relevance.  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1 
Experiment 1: Participants’ Estimates of the Likelihood of the Theory Being True as a 
Function of Fact Number and Theory Ascription 
 
Figure 2 
Experiment 2: Participants’ Estimates of the Likelihood of the Theory Being True as a 
Function of Fact Number and Theory Ascription  
 
Figure 3 
Experiment 3: Participants’ Estimates of the Likelihood of the Theory Being True as a 
Function of Fact Number and Theory Ascription 
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Table 1 
Experiment 3: Intercorrelations between the Four Indices of Self-Enhancement 
Note. N = 703-717. NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory, 16-item version. SDE = Self-
Deceptive Enhancement (a subset of seven judgement-relevant items from the Biased 
Inventory of Desirable Responding). OCL = Overclaiming (the ratio of fake to real words 
that participants claimed to recognize). BAE = Biased Argument Evaluation (the extent to 
which participants’ judgments of argument quality diverged from consensus estimates). 
* p < .005. ** p < .0005. *** p < .00005 
 
 
 
 
 NPI SDE OCL BAE 
NPI 1    
SDE    .34*** 1   
OCT  .11*  .12* 1  
BAE   .14**   11*  .13* 1 
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